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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
tion has been resolved, courts can focus on interpreting particular
aspects of it. A problem recently posed centered on the efficacy of a
demand for a note of issue which was served by ordinary mail, rather
than by registered or certified mail as required under CPLR 3216.
In Beermont Corp. v. Yager,123 the court found that despite the
irregular mode of service plaintiff's attorney had not been preju-
diced. Consequently, the court granted a motion to dismiss for lack
of prosecution because a note of issue was not served within forty-five
days, and the attorney's sole excuse was a busy schedule, which is not
considered a justification for a denial of the motion. Moreover, the
court took notice of the five-year lapse between defendant's demand
for a bill of particulars and the appellant's compliance therewith.
Since the attorney in Beermont was not prejudiced by the irreg-
ular service, the court was justified in granting the motion to dis-
miss. 124 For, the demand did, in fact, serve its basic purpose: it ap-
prised the attorney of his situation. And, the irregular service was
not, in any event, related to the failure to file a note of issue within
forty-five days. Hence, exacting compliance with the service require-
ments by the defendant was not mandated. Conversely, a slight delay
by an attorney while attempting to comply with the demand should
also be overlooked.125
CPLR 5004: Conflict over legal rate of interest continues.
CPLR 5004 prescribes that "interest shall be paid at the legal
rate." This rate, which is set under section 5-501 of the General Ob-
ligations Law126 had traditionally been a flat 6 percent. An amend-
ment to section 5-501,127 however, authorized the Banking Board to
adjust the rate of interest "upon the loan or forbearance of any
money, goods, or things in action." Accordingly, during February
of 1969, the Board adopted the maximum rate of interest of 7.5 per-
cent.128
Without a specific declaration of legislative intent, the courts
had to determine the effect, if any, of the Board's action upon the
123 34 App. Div. 2d 589, 808 N.Y.S.2d 109 (3d Dep't 1970).
124 See CPLR 2001.
125 For example, where local court rules have thwarted an otherwise diligent effort
to procure a note of issue, an extension should be permitted without requiring the plain-
tiff to exhibit that his previous delay was justifiable. 73 MCKINNEY's CPLR 3216, com-
mentary 26, at 934 (1970).
126 N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW § 5-501 (McKinney 1964).
127 Id. (McKinney supp. 1968).
128 See 3 NYCRR 34.1 (1969).
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interest rates under sections 5001,129 5002,130 and 5003131 of the
CPLR. This depended on the interpretation given to the restrictive
phrase "loan or forbearance of any money" in the context of a statute
which might rationally be held to imply that such action by the Board
would collaterally change the above interest rates.
Simultaneously, polar conclusions were reached. The Attorney
General, relying upon a construction of the phrase "loan or forbear-
ance" as being applicable to purchase money mortgages, 132 announced
that the interest rate on money judgments remained at 6 percent.1 33
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, ruled that the higher
interest rate governed when computing interest on a note secured by
a mortgage on real estate which was subject to a foreclosure action. 3 4
To date, the conflict has been nurtured135 and, despite frequent
requests for legislative action, 30 has gone unresolved. In the latest
case, Rachlin & Co. v. Tra-Mar, Inc.,137 the court took cognizance of
the current rise in interest rates and concluded that the lower rate
of 6 percent might encourage a debtor to delay payment as long as
possible. Consequently, the higher rate was adopted.
The difficulties caused by the indecisiveness in this area are by
no means minute. The implications for an individual debtor are ap-
parent when it is recalled that interest in many cases runs from the
time the cause of action arises to the satisfaction of judgment- often
a number of years. For example, in Beyer v. Murray,3 8 five years
elapsed between the entry of judgment and the disposition of a sub-
sequent appeal. Nonetheless, the court ordered that interest accrued
from the date of the original verdict.
129 CPLR 5001 awards interest, in certain actions, from the accrual of a cause of ac-
tion until verdict, report or decision.
130 CPLR 5002 awards interest, in any action, from verdict, report or decision to
judgment.
131 CPLR 5003 provides that every money judgment shall bear interest from the date
of entry.
132 Mandelino v. Fribourg, 23 N.Y.2d 145, 242 N.E.2d 823, 295 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1968).
133 Op. Arr'Y GEN. oF N.Y. (informal and unofficial), appearing in 161 N.Y.L.J. 11,
Jan. 16, 1969, at I, col. 1.
134 Dime Savings Bank v. Carlozzo, 58 Misc. 2d 821, 296 N.Y.S.2d 805 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County 1969).
135 Compare Belcher v. Keston, 162 N.Y.L.J. 20, July 29, 1969, at 11, col. 7 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County) and Kay Lew Enterprises v. Lewis Marshall, 161 N.Y.L.J. 102, May 26,
1969, at 17, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) with Gelco Builders v. Simpson Factors Corp.,
161 N.Y.L.J. 121, June 23, 1969, at 14, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County). See also The Quar-
terly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. Ray. 340-42 (1969).
130 See, e.g., 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 5004, supp. commentary at 132-35 (1969).
137 33 App. Div. 2d 370, 308 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1st Dep't 1970).
138 33 App. Div. 2d 246, 306 N.Y.S.2d 619 (4th Dep't 1970).
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Collectively, millions of dollars are at stake.139 Moreover, when-
ever a choice of venue is possible, a conflict arises between the cred-
itor, seeking a 7.5 percent forum and parity with existing interest rates,
and the debtor, already beset with financial burdens, adamantly re-
sisting said forum via a motion for a change of venue.-40
Rachlin represents the first appellate pronouncement on whether
the interest rate under article 50 has been increased by the action of
the Banking Board. Based on the soundness of the decisions thus far,
it is improbable that any one approach can be considered the correct
one.141 Hence, it is conceivable that without prompt legislative ac-
tion, the conflict will merely be transposed onto the appellate level
rather than resolved.
CPLR 5015: Default judgments vacated sua sponte.
CPLR 5015 provides that the "court which rendered a judgment
... may relieve a party... upon such terms as may be just, on mo-
tion of an interested person." Does the phrase "interested person"
allow for a motion by the court itself? In Ail-State Credit v. Riess142
this question was answered in the affirmative. There, the appellate
term affirmed a Nassau County District Court's sua sponte vacatur
of default judgments and the underlying complaints in 669 actions
which had been consolidated.
The actions were based on various retail installment contracts.
None of the defendants were residents of Nassau County, nor were
they served with process there. Instead, jurisdiction was predicated
upon the long-arm provision of the UDCA.143 Since personal service
had not been effected, and the plaintiff failed to include the requisite
allegation concerning the basis for jurisdiction, the court concluded
that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants. 144
Although the Al-State decision ostensibly exceeds a court's ex-
press power under CPLR 5015, it is justifiable in view of a court's
inherent authority to vacate judgments.145 Indeed, it would be an ab-
139 See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR, commentary at 132-34 (1969).
140 CPLR 511(a).
141 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 5004, commentary at 132-34 (1969).
142 61 Misc. 2d 677, 306 N.Y.S.2d 596 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1970).
143 UDCA § 404(a)(1) & (b).
144 Cf. Coffman v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 60 Misc. 2d 81, 302 N.Y.S.2d 480
(Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1969).
145 CPLR 5015 contains five grounds for relief: (1) excusable default; (2) newly dis-
covered evidence; (3) fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adversary; (4)
lack of jurisdiction, and (5) reversal, modification or vacatur of a prior judgment or order.
Nevertheless, courts have consistently opined that these grounds are not exclusive. Rather,
the court's power is inherent. Ladd v. Stevenson, 112 N.Y. 325, 19 N.E. 842 (1889). See also
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